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Abstract
While students from more advantageous family backgrounds tend to perform
better, it is not clear that they exert more eﬀort compared to those from less advan-
tageous family backgrounds. We build a model of students, schools, and employers
to study the interaction of family background and eﬀort exerted by the student in
the education process. Academic qualiﬁcations, which entail an income premium in
the labor market, are noisily determined by eﬀort and the student's ability to beneﬁt
from education, which in turn depends on her family background and innate talent.
In a situation where schools set the optimal passing standard, two factors turn out
to be key in determining the relationship between eﬀort and family background: (i)
the student's risk aversion and (ii) the degree with which family background alters
the student's marginal productivity of eﬀort. We show that when the degree of risk
aversion is relatively low (high) compared to the sensitivity of the marginal pro-
ductivity of the student's eﬀort with respect to her family background, the relation
between eﬀort and family background is positive (negative) and students from more
advantageous family backgrounds exert more (less) eﬀort. Considering Spanish data
and controlling for school ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd that an improvement in parental
education from not having completed compulsory education to holding a university
degree is associated to around 15% more eﬀort by the student (approximately 1 hour
and 20 minutes of additional weekly homework). We also ﬁnd empirical evidence
consistent with our assumption that students' marginal productivity of eﬀort varies
with family background.
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1 Introduction
The inﬂuence of parental resources on the academic performance of children has re-
ceived a great deal of attention in the economic literature. For the UK, Ermisch and
Francesconi [2001] ﬁnd that students' performance in school is strongly associated with
their parents' educational attainments. According to Haveman and Wolfe [1995], the
strong correlation between parental income and student's scholarly achievements is one
of the major ﬁndings in the literature on the determinants of children's attainments.1
However, the fact that children of parents with high levels of schooling or income perform
better than those from less advantageous family backgrounds does not necessarily imply
that the former exert relatively more eﬀort. As eﬀort and talent constitute the center-
pieces of a meritocratic society, the question of how eﬀort and family background relate
is in our view of great interest.
The current paper attempts to advance in the understanding of the determinants of eﬀort
exerted by the student in the education process, and in particular its relation with family
background. We build a model of students, schools, and employers where academic quali-
ﬁcations, which entail an income premium in the labor market, are noisily determined by
eﬀort and the student's ability to beneﬁt from education. This ability in turn depends on
her family background and her innate talent. Our theoretical results show that if schools
can set the optimal passing standard, two factors turn out to be key in determining the
relationship between eﬀort and family background: (i) the student's risk aversion and
(ii) the degree with which family background alters the student's marginal productivity
of eﬀort. We show that when the degree of risk aversion is relatively low compared to
the sensitivity of the marginal productivity of the student's eﬀort with respect to her
family background, the relation between eﬀort and family background is positive and stu-
dents from more advantageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort. On the other hand,
when the degree of risk aversion is relatively high, students from less advantageous family
backgrounds exert more eﬀort than those from more advantageous family backgrounds.
Empirically, we ﬁnd support for the ﬁrst case. Considering Spanish data for 12-year old
students from the Madrid region (Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables,
CDI) and controlling for school ﬁxed eﬀects, our results show that an improvement in
parental education from not having completed compulsory education to holding a univer-
sity degree is associated to around 15% more eﬀort by the student (approximately 1 hour
and 20 minutes of additional weekly homework). We also ﬁnd empirical evidence consis-
1 Also, Blanden and Gregg [2004] show that the positive relationship between family income and
educational attainment in the UK has been strengthened over time. Feinstein and Symons [1999] establish
parental interest, through motivation, discipline, and support, to be one of the major determinants for
children's academic achievements.
tent with our theoretical assumption that students' marginal productivity of eﬀort varies
with family background. For students whose parents are blue collar workers studying
fewer than 8 hours per week is related to a lower test score, while more than 12 hours of
study are related to a higher test score. On the contrary, for students whose parents are
professional or administrative workers who hold a university degree fewer than 8 hours of
homework per week are associated to a higher test score while more than 12 of hours of
study are related to a lower test score.
For given levels of ability, student eﬀort is one of the most important input factors for
the production of education, and diﬀerent from other inputs like teacher quality, school
autonomy, or class size, student eﬀort is an individual decision variable. However, stu-
dent eﬀort in the production of education has received only limited attention both on
theoretical and empirical grounds. One of the few works in the theoretical literature that
takes into account student eﬀort, is an undeservingly little noticed paper by Correa and
Gruver [1987] analyzing teacher-student interactions in a game theoretical framework. A
more recent paper is De Fraja and Landeras [2006] who show that increasing the power of
incentives and the eﬀectiveness of competition in schools may have the counterintuitive
eﬀect of lowering student eﬀort. Landeras [2009] compares a standard grading system to
a competitive grading system (tournament) in terms of the level of student eﬀort each
system is able to motivate, and shows that the system's relative advantage depends cru-
cially on the nature of the noise distorting academic achievement. The model by Lin and
Lai [1996] shows that when leisure is a normal good and students are given monetary
rewards unrelated to their academic performance they will be less diligent.
Given the diﬃculty to obtain an independent measure of eﬀort, empirical studies rarely
include student eﬀort into estimations of education production functions.2 Exceptions are
however Bonesrønning [2003] and [2004], Cooley [2010], De Fraja et al [2010], and Stine-
brickner and Stinebrickner [2008] which are among the few papers that provide measures
of eﬀort exerted by students and parents and estimate the eﬀects of eﬀort on schooling at-
tainment.3 Hence, the current paper advances both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
It contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical model of student eﬀort and
2An additional constraint faced by researchers is the fact that only few data sets include information
about student eﬀort. For the TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) study
for instance, teachers instead of students report information about homework time, turning the variable
homework time into an estimate by teachers of the time needed for homework assigned, rather than a
measure of study time by students.
3The literature on this topic in sociology and education science is less scarce; see Fan and Chen [2001]
for a meta-analysis of existing empirical studies that analyze the role of parental eﬀort on scholarly
achievement.
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achievement that takes into account how student eﬀort interacts with risk aversion and
family background. In addition, using Spanish student data that include a measure of
eﬀort (homework time per week) we are able to empirically test certain assumptions and
results of our theoretical model.
Furthermore, the current paper contributes to raising awareness to the role of students'
risk aversion for educational choices. When making educational choices and deciding
about the level of eﬀort exerted, students face various types of risks related to labor mar-
ket returns as well as to the direct costs and the opportunity costs of education. Only few
works in the literature have taken into account students' attitudes towards risk and their
eﬀects on schooling choices. While theoretical models like De Fraja [2002] address the
importance of risk aversion for educational choices, empirical evidence regarding students'
risk aversion is still limited and in particular the magnitude of income risk eﬀects on edu-
cational choices is highly disputed. For instance, Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgersen [2006] use
a structural model of life-time utility maximization and ﬁnd a parameter estimate of the
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of around 5, while other empirical studies such as Belzil
and Leonardi [2007], Brodaty et al [2006], and Belzil and Hansen [2004] all suggest lower
degrees of students' relative risk aversion of around 0.5, around 0.75, and 0.93 respectively.
Belzil and Hansen [2004] also ﬁnd that an increase in the degree of risk aversion increases
schooling attainments. The same result holds true in our model where risk aversion plays
a central role for the student's optimal decision of eﬀort because qualiﬁcations that entail
an income premium in the labor market are noisily determined by eﬀort and the student's
ability to beneﬁt from education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model, the
student's choice of the optimal level of eﬀort exerted as well as the school's decision
regarding the optimal passing standard that maximizes student eﬀort. In Section 3 we
then analyze in greater detail the eﬀect of family background on student eﬀort. Section 4
provides an empirical test of our theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of education with three groups of agents: students, schools, and
employers. Our model is an extension of Landeras [2009], taking into account interde-
pendencies between family background and student eﬀort, as well as interdependencies
between risk aversion and student eﬀort.4
4Note that in particular Proposition 2.2 is equivalent to Equation 6 in Landeras [2009].
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Students Students diﬀer in terms of their ability to beneﬁt from education a ∈ IR,
which in turn depends on a student's family background (family resources such as house-
hold income, parental education, etc.) denoted by b ∈ IR, as well as on her innate talent
θ. Thus, a = h (b, θ) , satisfying hb (·) > 0 and hθ (·) > 0. Students from more advan-
tageous family backgrounds and those with more innate talent have a higher ability to
beneﬁt from education. In addition we assume decreasing returns to scale in both factors,
hbb (·) < 0 and hθθ (·) < 0. We also assume that given two students from similar family
backgrounds but with diﬀerent innate talent, the student with higher talent beneﬁts more
from an increase in her family resources, and hence hbθ (·) > 0.
A student decides about the eﬀort she exerts in school e ∈ E ⊆ IR+, i.e. the time she
spends studying, how diligent she is, how hard she works, etc. Exerting eﬀort implies a
utility cost measured by the function ψ (e) , increasing and convex, ψ′ (e) > 0, ψ′′ (e) > 0.
Given that eﬀort is not perfectly observable, the school cannot reward eﬀort directly. The
student's utility function U (y, e), is additively separable with y being the expected amount
of resources enjoyed by the student (the sum of family resources b, and her potential labor
market income w).5 Formally,
U (y, e) = u (b+ w)− ψ (e) , (2.1)
assumed to satisfy u′ (·) > 0, u′′ (·) ≤ 0.
Schools Schools issue qualiﬁcations q ∈ Q ⊆ IR+. Formally we deﬁne a qualiﬁcation
issued by a school for a student as,
q = ξ (h (b, θ) , e) + . (2.2)
Hence, a student's qualiﬁcation is the sum of her educational attainment ξ (·) and a ran-
dom variable ε, which is distributed according to Φ [ε] , diﬀerentiable and symmetric with
Φ′ [ε] = φ [ε] , and with a positive support in the real line. This implies that qualiﬁcations
measure academic achievement imperfectly. A student's true attainment ξ (·) depends on
her eﬀort e and on her ability to beneﬁt from education a, depending on innate talent θ
and family background b.6 We assume ξhb (·) > 0, ξhθ (·) > 0, and ξe (·) > 0, a student
5An alternative modeling choice for the individual's cost of education can be found in Nielsen and
Vissing-Jorgensen [2006] where instead of an utility cost of eﬀort forgone wages imply a trade-oﬀ between
further education and working.
6Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles [2003] show for the United Kingdom that the role of cognitive ability
on educational attainment has actually decreased since the 1970s and 1980s, while the role of parental
social class and income in determining educational attainment has increased.
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is more productive if she has a higher ability to beneﬁt from education (as a result of a
higher innate talent and/or a more advantageous family background) and if she exerts
more eﬀort in school. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in all input factors,
hence ξhbb (·) < 0, ξhθθ (·) < 0, and ξee (·) < 0. In addition we assume ξeh (·) > 0, i.e. ef-
fort increases attainment more for students with a higher ability to beneﬁt from education.
Furthermore, we denote by q̂ the passing standard, i.e. the level of qualiﬁcation required
for a binary credential. Students who receive a qualiﬁcation q greater or equal than q̂
obtain a degree, while those with q < q̂ simply receive a certiﬁcate of attendance. The
probability of passing and obtaining a degree is thus given by
Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1− Φ (q̂ − ξ (h (b, θ) , e)) . (2.3)
Employers Before entering the labor market all individuals attend school and an indi-
vidual's income in the labor market depends on her schooling.7 Contracts take the form
of reward schedules based on the student's qualiﬁcation, i.e. noisy observations of the
student's true attainment. Accordingly, the labor market income or return to education
in the labor market w, can be deﬁned by the following scheme:
w =
{
wS = w + x if the student obtained a degree q ≥ q̂
wF = w else q < q̂,
(2.4)
where wS and wF denote the student's labor market income in case of having obtained
a degree and else, respectively. We think of x as the risk premium of the student's
educational investment. For simplicity we assume that w = 0.
2.1 The student's optimal choice of eﬀort
Given her family's socio-economic background b, her innate talent θ, and the school's
passing standard q̂, the student chooses her optimal level of eﬀort e, such as to maximize
her expected utility
EU = [1− Φ (·)]u (b+ x) + Φ (·)u (b)− ψ (e) . (2.5)
First and second order conditions for the maximization of Equation 2.5 with respect to
eﬀort e, are given by:
EU ′ = φ (·) ξe (·)A− ψ′ (e) = 0, (2.6)
7There is substantial empirical evidence showing a positive relation between qualiﬁcation and future
earnings in the labor market, see for instance Psacharopoulos and Layard [1979] for the United Kingdom.
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EU ′′ =
(−φ′ (·) ξe (·)2 + φ (·) ξee (·))A− ψ′′ (e) < 0, (2.7)
where A = [u (b+ x)− u (b)] denotes the utility gain from passing the school's standard.8
The ﬁrst order condition (2.6) implicitly deﬁnes e∗ = e (q̂, x, b, θ), i.e. the student's
expected eﬀort reaction function to changes in (i) the passing standard q̂, (ii) the labor
market risk premium x, and (iii) her family's socio-economic background b given her
innate talent θ. We deﬁne by Ax = u
′ (b+ x) the derivative of the utility gain from
passing the school's standard with respect to the labor market risk premium, x and state
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. An increase in the labor market risk premium x, brings about an increase
in the student's eﬀort, e.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the labor market risk premium,
x yields
de
dx
=
φ (·) ξe (·)Ax
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.8)
Since −EU ′′ (·) > 0, the sign of the above derivative depends on Ax, the marginal utility
gain. Given that Ax > 0, Equation 2.8 is also positive and hence, as the labor market risk
premium increases, the student will exert more eﬀort. This establishes the lemma.
Lemma 2.1 captures the fact that students, as other economic agents, respond positively
to incentives. Employers can aﬀect a student's eﬀort by changing the labor market reward.
A higher labor market risk premium increases the marginal utility gain of eﬀort, making
it worthwhile for the student to work harder in order to meet the passing standard. Ad-
ditionally, schools can also aﬀect a student's eﬀort by regulating the level of qualiﬁcation
required to obtain a degree. The next result characterizes the school's optimal decision
regarding the passing standard, q̂∗.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a choice of the school's passing standard q̂, say q̂∗, that
maximizes student eﬀort e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). This occurs when φ′ (q̂ − ξ (h (b, θ) , e)) = 0 which
requires q̂ = ξ (·) .
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the school's passing standard
q̂, we obtain
de
dq̂
=
φ′ (·) ξe (·)A
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.9)
8We assume that φ′ (·) > 0 and φ′ (·) > φ(·)ξee(·)A−ψ′′(e)
ξe(·)2A for any e, such that EU
′′ < 0 holds.
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Given that the value of the denominator is positive, the sign of the above derivative
depends on the sign of the derivative of the density function φ′ (·). For φ′ (·) > 0, the
school's passing standard is lower than the student's true attainment, q̂ < ξ (·). In
that case, the probability of passing the standard, (1− Φ (·)) , is relatively high (greater
than 0.5 for Φ [ε] symmetric), so the student works harder when the passing standard is
increased, de
dq̂
> 0. However, for φ′ (·) < 0, the passing standard q̂ is relatively high which
implies that the probability of failure is also high. In this case an increase in q̂ reduces
the optimal level of eﬀort, de
dq̂
< 0. Finally, for φ′ (·) = 0, which implies q̂ = ξ (·), we
can determine the value of q̂∗ that maximizes e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). Hence, the optimal passing
standard, q̂∗ assures that the level of eﬀort chosen by the student e∗, is the highest level
feasible given the student's preferences.9
Figure 2.1 depicts Proposition 2.2. The upper graph represents the student's eﬀort reac-
tion function e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). The relationship between student eﬀort and passing standard
is non-monotonous. The student's optimal eﬀort level increases ﬁrst and then decreases
as the passing standard is raised. This is due to the fact that when the passing standard
is low, students initially tend to work harder as schools raise the passing standard. How-
ever, when the passing standard becomes too high, students lose motivation because the
marginal cost of eﬀort is too high compared to the expected utility gain from the labor
market risk premium associated with obtaining the qualiﬁcation. The student's reaction
function attains a maximum, which corresponds to the optimal passing standard chosen
by schools, q̂∗. This passing standard is set such as to induce the highest optimal eﬀort
the student is willing to exert, and it is implicitly determined in the lower graph of Fig-
ure 2.1. The intersection of the marginal cost of eﬀort ψ′ (e) , and the marginal beneﬁt of
eﬀort Aφ (·) ξe (·) , pins down the highest optimal eﬀort the student is willing to exert and
thus implicitly determines the optimal passing standard. This intersection occurs when-
ever φ′ (·) = 0, which ensures that the student's true attainment is equal to the passing
standard, ξ (·) = q̂. Hence, the optimal passing standard is such that it eliminates any
noise that stands between a student's true attainment and the school's passing standard.
Figure 2.1 also illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in the labor market risk premium on
student eﬀort (see Lemma 2.1). A higher labor market risk premium x, leads to an up-
ward shift of the student's eﬀort reaction function (dotted line). This shift implies a new
intersection of the marginal cost ψ′ (e) , and the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort Aφ (·) ξe (·) ,
and hence it also implies a new optimal passing standard. A higher labor market return
increases the marginal beneﬁts of student eﬀort, making it worthwhile for the student
9The second order diﬀerential of eﬀort e, with respect to the passing standard is: d2e/dq̂2 =
[(φ′′ (·) ξe (·)A) (ψ′′ (e)− φ (·) ξee (·)A)] / [−EU ′′ (·)]2. This ratio is negative if and only if φ′′ (·) < 0.
Note that this condition is satisﬁed only if φ (·) is concave near the mode.
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Figure 2.1: The Optimal Passing Standard, q̂∗
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to work harder in order to meet the new higher passing standard q̂∗′. Due to this higher
passing standard the ﬁnal increase in student eﬀort goes beyond the initial increase caused
by the higher labor market premium.
A student's innate talent also aﬀects her optimal choice of eﬀort exerted. The following
lemma captures this.
Lemma 2.3. When the passing standard is optimal or higher, a more able student exerts
more eﬀort, i.e. de
dθ
≥ 0 when φ′ (·) ≤ 0.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the student's innate talent θ,
yields
de
dθ
=
(−φ′ (·) ξhθ (·) ξe (·) + φ (·) ξehθ (·))A
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.10)
Given that the value of the denominator is positive the sign of the above derivative depends
on the sign of the derivative of the density function φ′ (·). Note that all other terms in
the numerator are positive. Thus, when φ′ (·) ≤ 0, Equation 2.10 is positive and hence, a
more able student exerts more eﬀort. The opposite does not necessarily hold true. When
φ′ (·) > 0, Equation 2.10 may be positive or negative. This establishes the lemma.
8
When the passing standard chosen by schools is high, (q̂ > q̂∗) by Proposition 2.2 students
lose motivation because the marginal cost of eﬀort is too high compared to the expected
utility gain from the labor market return of the academic qualiﬁcation. According to
Lemma 2.3 in such cases, students endowed with higher innate talent, which positively
aﬀects student's true attainment, will also exert more eﬀort in order to meet the required
passing standard. Hence, innate talent inﬂuences achievement positively both directly,
ξhθ (·) > 0, and indirectly via additional eﬀort, ξehθ (·) > 0.
3 Student eﬀort and family background
A student's family background inﬂuences her potential income directly via better learning
eﬃciency (i.e. more advantageous families enable their children to learn more eﬀectively),
or indirectly via greater social capital, better social networks etc. In this section we con-
sider how family background may aﬀect student' s potential income directly by aﬀecting
student eﬀort and consequently the student's academic attainment and qualiﬁcation.
3.1 A benchmark case: a = h (θ)
We ﬁrst consider as a benchmark case, a situation in which family background does not
aﬀect a student's ability to beneﬁt from education. In such a case (a = h(θ)) the student's
true attainment is given by ξ (h (θ) , e) and the probability of passing the school's standard
and obtaining a degree is given by Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1 − Φ (q̂ − ξ (h (θ) , e)). We denote
by Ab = [u
′ (b+ x)− u′ (b)] the derivative of the utility gain from passing the school's
standard with respect to a student's family background b, and we state the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If the student exhibits risk aversion, that is if Ab < 0, then positive changes
in her family background lead to reductions in student eﬀort.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to family background, b when
a = h(θ), yields
de
db
=
φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) < 0. (3.11)
Since −EU ′′ (·) > 0, φ (·) > 0 and ξe (·) > 0, the sign of the above derivative depends on
the sign of Ab. As Ab < 0 for the case that the student exhibits risk aversion, Equation 3.11
is negative and hence, students from more advantageous family backgrounds (those with
higher b) will exert less eﬀort. This establishes the lemma.
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This result is driven by the way a student's family background b, determines how a
higher labor market return x, encourages eﬀort. Given our noisy academic context, by
Lemma 2.1, an increase in the reward for learning will induce an increase in eﬀort, but as
the student becomes better-oﬀ, the incentive to work harder is reduced and therefore she
exerts less eﬀort. It can also be easily proven that if the student is risk neutral, (Ab = 0),
her family background b, has no eﬀect on her optimal choice of eﬀort e. The risk aversion
hypothesis is thus key in order for a negative relationship between eﬀort e, and family
background b, to arise. However, if diﬀerent from the benchmark case considered the
ability to beneﬁt from education is directly aﬀected by the student's family background
this negative relationship might no longer hold.
3.2 The case: a = h (b, θ)
When a student's ability to beneﬁt from education is directly inﬂuenced by her family
background (a = h(b, θ)), the relationship between eﬀort and family background is altered.
In this case, the student's true attainment is given by ξ (h (b, θ) , e) , and the probability
of passing the school's standard and obtaining a degree is given by Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1 −
Φ (q̂ − ξ (h (b, θ) , e)). In order to analyze the conditions that determine the student's
optimal choice of eﬀort for this case we totally diﬀerentiate Equation 2.6 with respect to
family background b, assuming that a = h(b, θ)
de
db
=
−φ′ (·) ξhb (·) ξe (·)A+ φ (·) ξehb (·)A+ φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) . (3.12)
Given three eﬀects in play, a risk aversion eﬀect Ab, a direct productivity eﬀect ξhb (·) ,
and a cross productivity eﬀect ξehb (·) , the above derivative can have either sign. Hence,
in order to obtain tractable results, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let ηb (ξe) =
ξehb(·)b
ξe(·) and ηb (A) =
Abb
A
be the elasticities of ξe and A with
respect to b, respectively. In general, for x suﬃciently small, ηb (A) converges to the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion RRA (b) = −uyy(·)
uy(·) b.
Proof. For yb = yx = 1, Lim
x→0
(
Ab
A
)
= Lim
x→0
(
uy(b+x)yb−uy(b)yb
u(b+x)−u(b)
)
= Lim
x→0
(
uyy(b+x)yx
uy(b+x)yx
)
= uyy(b)
uy(b)
,
which proves convergence of ηb (A) to RRA (b) . In particular, for functional forms of the
utility function such as u (y) = − exp−βy (which displays constant absolute risk aversion),
ηb (A) = β = RRA, irrespectively of the size of x. This establishes the lemma.
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The elasticity ηb (A) relates to the concavity of the utility function and provides a mea-
sure for the student's risk aversion, while the elasticity ηb (ξe) measures the sensitivity
of the marginal productivity of student eﬀort with respect to her family background b.10
Lemma 3.2 allows us to state the next result.
Proposition 3.3. If the risk aversion eﬀect dominates the cross productivity eﬀect, i.e
ηb (A) > ηb (ξe) and schools set a passing standard that is lower than the optimal standard
(q̂ < q̂∗), then eﬀort is decreasing in family background (de
db
< 0). On the other hand,
if the cross productivity eﬀect dominates the risk aversion eﬀect, i.e ηb (A) < ηb (ξe) and
schools set a passing standard higher than the optimal standard (q̂ > q̂∗), then student
eﬀort and family background relate positively (de
db
> 0). In particular, when schools set the
optimal passing standard (q̂ = q̂∗) and the risk aversion eﬀect is higher (lower) than the
cross productivity eﬀect (ηb (A) T ηb (ξe)) then student eﬀort and family background relate
negatively (positively) (de
∗
db
S 0).
Proof. From Proposition 2.2 we know that when q̂ < q̂∗, the school's passing standard is
lower than the student's true attainment, q̂ < ξ (·) , which implies φ′ (·) > 0. In this case,
the eﬀect of family background on student eﬀort, captured by Equation 3.12 depends on
the sign of
(
ηb (ξe)− ηb (A)− bξhb φ′(·)φ(·)
)
.Given that the last term is positive, the expression
in parentheses is strictly negative whenever ηb (ξe) < ηb (A). Therefore students from more
advantageous family backgrounds will exert less eﬀort. Note that the opposite does not
necessarily hold. When q̂ < q̂∗, and ηb (ξe) > ηb (A) , then Equation 3.12 may be of either
sign. On the other hand, the ambiguity disappears when ηb (ξe) > ηb (A) and q̂ > q̂
∗, which
occurs when the passing standard is higher than the student's true attainment, q̂ < ξ (·),
which implies φ′ (·) < 0. In this case, the sign of
(
ηb (ξe)− ηb (A)− bξhb φ′(·)φ(·)
)
is strictly
positive, whenever ηb (ξe) > ηb (A) , and therefore students from more advantageous family
backgrounds will exert more eﬀort. Note that again the opposite does not necessarily
hold. When q̂ > q̂∗, and ηb (ξe) < ηb (A) , then Equation 3.12 may be of either sign. For
prooﬁng the third statement of Proposition 3.3 consider Proposition 2.2. There exists
a passing standard chosen by schools q̂, say q̂∗, that maximizes the student's optimal
eﬀort e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). This occurs when φ′ (·) = 0, which requires q̂ = ξ (·) . In this case,
Equation 3.12 becomes
de∗
db
=
φ (·) ξehb (·)A+ φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) , (3.13)
with EU ′′ (·) = φ (·) ξee (·)A − ψ′′ (e) < 0. Since the denominator is positive, the sign of
Equation 3.13 is therefore determined by the sign of (ηb (ξe)− ηb (A)) . The rest follows
straight forward.
10 ηb (A) deﬁnes relative risk aversion in the same way as the Arrow-Pratt elasticity, RRA (b) =
−uyy(·)
uy(·) b.
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Figure 3.2: Eﬀort and Family Background when q̂ = q̂∗.
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Given Proposition 3.3, and in particular in a situation where the school's passing stan-
dard is the optimal one and when students are suﬃciently risk averse, students from less
advantageous family background who have a lower ability to beneﬁt from education are
the ones who exert more eﬀort. This result also holds even if the school chooses a lower
passing standard than the optimal one and the student thus does not choose the maxi-
mum level of eﬀort. In this case, the more relative risk-averse the student is, the higher
the likelihood of responding negatively in terms of eﬀort as she becomes better-oﬀ. This
case is depicted in Graph a) of Figure 3.2.
On the other hand, given the optimal passing standard, if the degree of risk aversion is
relatively low compared to the elasticity related to the marginal productivity of eﬀort,
eﬀort and family background are positively related with those from more advantageous
family backgrounds exerting more eﬀort (see Graph c) of Figure 3.2). This result also
holds even if the school cannot induce exactly the maximum eﬀort the student is able
to exert, but establishes a passing standard higher than the optimal one. Hence, the
less relative risk-averse the student is, the higher the likelihood of responding positively
in terms of eﬀort as she becomes better-oﬀ. There also exists the possibility of a non-
monotonous relationship between family background and eﬀort. Graph b) of Figure 3.2
shows that if for low levels of family background the degree of risk aversion is higher
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than the elasticity regarding the student's marginal productivity of eﬀort, eﬀort decreases
in family background b. However, as the two functions cross at b∗, the eﬀect of family
background on the choice of eﬀort starts to turn positive. As the degree of risk aversion
is reduced furthermore and the elasticity related to the marginal productivity of eﬀort
increase, students from more advantageous family backgrounds will exert more eﬀort.
4 Empirical Test
Given our theoretical results and the lack of conclusive empirical evidence regarding the
relationship between student eﬀort and family background, we consider an empirical test
of our theoretical model.11 We ﬁrst look at the relationship between family background
and student eﬀort. In particular we want to test empirically if students from more ad-
vantageous family backgrounds exert more or less eﬀort compared to those from less
advantageous family backgrounds. Assuming that schools set the optimal passing stan-
dard, in our theoretical model the way student eﬀort and family background relate is
determined by the relationship between the degree of the student's risk aversion and the
marginal productivity of the student's eﬀort. Hence, in a second step we test if and how
this marginal productivity of eﬀort varies with a student's family background.
4.1 Description of the Data
Data base For our empirical test we consider data from a standardized test that 6th
grade students (11 -12 years) in all primary schools of the Madrid region have to take
each year (`Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables, CDI).12 We use the
2009/2010 wave because while the test has been carried out since 2004/2005, only in
2009/2010 were students asked questions about their eﬀort (homework habits). The
outcome of the standardized test does not have any implications for students, but is used
to provide information to the education authorities. The test consists of two parts, each of
45 minutes length. The ﬁrst part tests students' reading, language, and general skills, and
it also includes a dictation. The second part of the test concerns mathematical skills. In
11The only other empirical analysis that considers the relationship between student eﬀort and family
background we are aware of is De Fraja et al [2010]. Diﬀerent from our results, the authors ﬁnd that
children from diﬀerent backgrounds do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their propensity to exert eﬀort. However,
as the authors themselves acknowledge their results are tentative and constrained by the limitations of
the data used.
12Access to this data set is restricted which is one of the reasons that it has been used little. One
exception is Anghel and Cabrales [2010].
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addition to the test, each student is asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire regarding individual
aspects, family characteristics, and homework habits.
Sample In 2009/2010, a total of 57,080 primary school students were enrolled in 6th
grade in the Madrid region. However, we only have test scores for 53,972 students.
In addition missing information regarding data from questionnaires further restricts our
sample. Excluding students who report less than one hour of homework a week we are
thus left with a sample of 46,636 students in 1,222 schools.
Descriptive Statistics Test results diﬀer considerably with some students obtaining
scores more than twice the score of others (see Tables A-1 and A-2 of the Appendix A
for all summary statistics).13 About half of all students are girls and most are around
12 years old. Around 13% of students have repeated at least one grade. Disabled and
special needs students make up 2% and 5% of our sample respectively. Most 6th grade
students in the Madrid region attend public schools (51%) followed by charter schools
(38%), and private schools (10%). Over 80% of all students were born in Spain, 9% of
students were born in a Spanish speaking country in Latin America while the remaining
8% come from countries with native languages diﬀerent than Spanish (China, Morocco,
Romania or others). A little over half of all students entered school before the age of 3,
and almost all students (97%) started school before the age of 6.
Regarding a student's family background, we consider the highest degree of education
and the highest occupational category among the two parents. Almost half of all students
have at least one parent who holds a university degree and 18% have at least one parent
who has completed an apprenticeship. In the case of 12% and 17% of students, at least
one parent has ﬁnished upper or lower secondary education respectively, and only 5% of
students are children of parents who have not completed compulsory education. Using
the highest number of years of schooling among parents, on average parents have received
approximately 13 years of schooling, where 12.5 years correspond to the length of school-
ing necessary for obtaining an apprenticeship.14 We group parents' occupations into: (i)
13Given diﬀerences in test score scales for the various subjects, original scores have been transformed to
represent percentages of maximum points obtainable. We obtain an overall test score by taking the mean
of transformed test scores from all ﬁve subjects. Then, deviations from the sample mean score have been
obtained and they have been divided by the standard deviation of the sample. In a last step, in order to
avoid zero scores unsuitable for a logarithmic scale, scores have been adjusted to an IQ scale, multiplying
the result by 15 and summing one hundred points (see Table A-3 of the Appendix A for mean scores for
each subject). The fact that average scores in Table A-1 are not exactly equal to one hundred points is
due to the restrictions imposed on our sample.
14We have transform categorical variables on parents' education into numerical variables assuming that
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blue collar, (ii) professional, and (iii) administrative occupations.15 Again considering the
highest occupational category among both parents, ranking professionals before adminis-
trative workers and before blue collar workers, 34% and 23% of students have at least one
parent whose occupation is categorized as professional, and administrative respectively.
The majority of students (44%) are children of blue collar workers. Regarding students'
household situation, most students (76%) live together with their mother and father, and
13% live in single-parent households. In addition, most students share their home with at
least one sibling, 66%. When returning home from school, a little over half of all students
are awaited by their mother and 6% of students return home to an empty house. Around
15% of students are awaited by somebody diﬀerent than their mother or father.
Students spend on average almost 9 hours per week doing homework, with some reporting
up to 40 hours. Most students receive some help with their homework while around 27%
report to do their homework by themselves. Around 30% of all students receive homework
help from their mothers, followed by mothers and fathers, and help from their fathers.
Only very few students (5%) receive help with their homework from private teachers.
Regarding the extent of homework help, 16 % of students do not receive any help at all
from their parents, while most students (63%) receive a little help.
4.2 Eﬀort and Family Background
In order to test empirically if students from more advantageous family backgrounds exert
more or less eﬀort compared to those from less advantageous family backgrounds, we
estimate the following regression of student eﬀort (ei,j) on family background (bi,j),
ei,j = βo + β1bi,j + β2xi,j + aj, (4.14)
controlling for individual characteristics of the student, homework habits, and her house-
hold situation (xi,j) as well as for school ﬁxed eﬀects (aj), with i and j being subindexes
for the student and the school respectively.16 To estimate Equation 4.14 we run an OLS
individuals do not repeat courses. Table A-4 of the Appendix A displays the equivalence scale in years
of schooling for each educational category.
15 These groups include the following: (i) blue collar: military, secretary, works in a restaurant or
hotel, policeman, ﬁre-ﬁghter, sales-man, shop assistant, cashier, works on construction site, maintenance
worker, carpenter, works in a factory, works in somebody' else household, security guard, cleaning service,
janitor; (ii) administrative workers: professional or technical worker (for example: professor, scientist,
doctor, engineer, lawyer, economist, psychologist, artist); (iii)professional: manages a ﬁrm, works in a
Ministry, works for the regional government, or works in the town hall.
16While there might exist an endogeneity problem regressing homework habits on hours of homework,
we consider it of secondary nature given that it only operates through the eﬀect of homework on achieve-
ment.
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regression with school ﬁxed eﬀects. School ﬁxed eﬀects allow us to control for a possible
bias that might arise from the sorting of students according to their family background
into schools. If schools with students from more advantageous family backgrounds sys-
tematically assign more homework, students from more advantageous family backgrounds
will report on average more weekly homework time. In this case, if we were to run an OLS
regression without school ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient of the variable for parental back-
ground would also be picking up a school's policy of assigning more homework. Hence by
introducing school ﬁxed eﬀects into the regression we can shut oﬀ any eﬀects of diﬀerent
school policies and focus on the direct eﬀects of a student's parental background on eﬀort.
As measures for the student's family background (bi,j) we include parents' log years of
schooling as well as the highest occupational category among parents'. We approximate
a student's innate talent (θ) by using a dummy variable for students who have repeated
a grade. As a measure of eﬀort (ei,j) we consider log hours of homework per week. Stu-
dents' individual variables controlled for in our regression are gender, country of birth, age
when starting school, situation at home, and help with homework.17 Table 4.1 presents
our estimation results. Our coeﬃcient of interest is β1, measuring the eﬀect of parental
background on eﬀort.
Considering our direct measure of parental background (maximum number of years of
education among parents), we ﬁnd that parental background is clearly positively related
to hours of homework by students, i.e. students from more advantageous backgrounds
exert more eﬀort. Comparing a student with a parent who graduated from university to
a student whose parent has not ﬁnished any compulsory education, if the latter dedicates
9 hours (mean value) a week to homework, the former studies around 10.32 hours per
week, 14.76% more. Coeﬃcients of dummy variables for parental occupation point in the
same direction. Compared to children of blue collar workers, children of professionals and
administrative workers spend more hours per week doing homework, +4% and +2.5%
respectively.
17Our data set does not provide all information needed to estimate our theoretical student's eﬀort
best response function (e∗ = e (q̂, x, b, θ)). In particular, we lack information on the labor market risk
premium (x), as well as the threshold for passing (q̂), given that test scores have no academic consequence
for students.
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Table 4.1: Coeﬃcients from School Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Hours of Homework
Log Years of Parents' Schooling 0.082*** (0.015)
Occupational Category Parents: Professional 0.040*** (0.010)
Administrative 0.025** (0.010)
Has repeated grade -0.148*** (0.014)
With special needs -0.254*** (0.022)
Disabled -0.282*** (0.033)
Girl 0.064*** (0.007)
Homework Help from: Mother also 0.027** (0.010)
Father -0.026* (0.014)
Private Teacher -0.041** (0.021)
Others -0.000 (0.018)
Homework help from parents: A little 0.048*** (0.012)
Quite some 0.038** (0.015)
Much 0.026 (0.023)
All -0.034 (0.047)
At home when returning from school: Father also -0.003 (0.008)
Others -0.014 (0.011)
Nobody -0.038** (0.016)
Lives with: Mother only -0.079*** (0.016)
Mother and siblings -0.053*** (0.016)
Mother and father only -0.018* (0.011)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.023** (0.010)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.017 (0.013)
Started School between 3 and 5 -0.024*** (0.008)
age 6 -0.081*** (0.031)
age 7 -0.159*** (0.044)
Born in Romania 0.170*** (0.027)
Morocco 0.210*** (0.044)
China 0.215*** (0.057)
elsewhere -0.032 (0.019)
Latin America -0.084*** (0.017)
Constant 1.707*** (0.037)
Observations 46,636
Number of Schools 1,222
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reference group: Boy born in Spain who
started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (blue collar workers) and one sibling whose mother
is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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Thus, our empirical ﬁndings suggest that among the group of 12 year old Spanish students
those from more advantageous backgrounds are the ones exerting more eﬀort.18 In addi-
tion, our estimation also conﬁrm our theoretical result that students of lower innate talent
exert less eﬀort (see Lemma 2.3). Having repeated a grade reduces weekly homework by
almost 15%. Coeﬃcients of variables of individual characteristics, homework habits and
household situation show the expected signs.
4.3 Marginal Productivity of Eﬀort and Family Background
According to Proposition 3.3, if as in our empirical result, students from more advan-
tageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort (de
db
> 0) and if schools can set the op-
timal passing standard (q̂ = q̂∗) a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this is that
ηb(ξe) > ηb(A), i.e. either a student's marginal productivity of eﬀort is very sensitive to
her family background and/or her risk aversion is not very high. In order to better eval-
uate the possible magnitude of the marginal productivity eﬀect, we specify the following
functional form for the student's achievement function
qi,j = βo + β1bi,j + β2ei,j + β1,2bi,jei,j + β3xi,j + aj, (4.15)
where as before (ei,j) denotes student eﬀort, (bi,j) are family background variables, (xi,j)
are variables of individual characteristics, homework habits, and household situation and
(aj) are school ﬁxed eﬀects, with i and j being subindexes for the student and the school
respectively. In addition, we also include interaction terms between parental background
variables and student eﬀort in order to test our theoretical assumption of a possible dis-
tinct impact of student eﬀort on achievement according to family background (β1,2 6= 0).
Specifying qi,j as the log of the student's test score we can estimate Equation 4.15 using
an OLS regression with school ﬁxed eﬀects. Sorting of students into schools according to
family background, in combination with diﬀerences in schools' resources that might aﬀect
academic achievement of students diﬀerently (number and quality of teachers, ﬁnance etc)
could lead to a bias in an estimation without ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimation of Equation 4.15
faces a clear endogeneity problem given that the time students spent doing homework not
only determines their achievement but that this time is possibly also determined by their
past achievement. However, while we thus cannot conclude anything about the causal re-
lationship between family background and student eﬀort on achievement, we are still able
18 The fact that students born in Rumania, China, and Morocco spend 17% to 22% more hours on
homework than students born in Spain could at ﬁrst point in the opposite direction of our ﬁndings
(students of less advantageous family backgrounds exerting more eﬀort). However, this does not hold
for students from Spanish speaking Latin American countries and hence more hours of homework by
students from some immigrant groups is more likely to be due to their limited language skills rather than
a less advantageous family background.
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to say something about the diﬀerent relation of eﬀort according to family background.19
Table 4.2 shows our estimation results. Our coeﬃcient of interest is β1,2, indicating possi-
ble diﬀerences in the relation between eﬀort and achievement for students from diﬀerent
family backgrounds. We ﬁnd that for students whose parents are professional or adminis-
trative workers with university education weekly study of up to eight hours is associated
to better test scores, while the relation is negative (however not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero) for those whose parents are blue collar workers.20 The opposite holds true for weekly
homework study of more than 12 hours per week, though in this case coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In general and independent of parental background, the
relation between eﬀort and scholarly achievement indicated is clearly hump-shaped. Less
than eight hours of homework per week seem to be negatively related to achievement
while the same holds true for more than 12 hours per week.21 Students studying around
8 to 12 hours are the ones obtaining better scores. Coeﬃcients of variables of individual
characteristics, homework habits, and household situation show the expected signs.
Hence, the results of our empirical test seem to indicate that a student's marginal produc-
tivity of eﬀort is quite sensitive to her family background. This suggests that our ﬁnding
that students from more advantageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort seems to be
largely determined by the fact that these students are somehow better equipped to turn
hours of homework (eﬀort) into higher test scores (better achievements) than students
from less advantageous family backgrounds. In the theoretical part of our paper a pos-
itive relation between eﬀort and family background implied that the cross productivity
eﬀect dominated the risk aversion eﬀect.22 Having estimated an approximation of the
cross-productivity eﬀect via our achievement function suggests an empirical conﬁrmation
of this theoretical result. However, given that there does not exist any consistent esti-
mation regarding the degree of risk aversion of students, we can only conclude on the
qualitative nature of the relation between the risk aversion eﬀect and the cross produc-
tivity eﬀect, the later apparently dominating the former.
19Again student ability is an omitted variable. However, as before we use the fact that some students
have repeated a year as a proxy for ability.
20 We have grouped parents' educational and professional categories into (i) blue collar workers (ii)
professional or administrative workers without university (iii) professional or administrative workers with
university.
21 We have converted homework time into a categorical variable, in order to better interpret results (
see Table A-5 of the Appendix A).
22It also implied that school were setting the optimal or higher than optimal passing standards, some-
thing that given the limitations of our data set we cannot investigate further empirically.
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Table 4.2: Coeﬃcients from School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score
Fewer than 8 Hours of Homework -0.023*** (0.003)
More than 12 Hours of Homework -0.006* (0.003)
Parental Background: Blue Collar Worker -0.013*** (0.003)
Professional or Administrative with Uni 0.020*** (0.002)
< 8 hours hmwk*Parents Blue Collar -0.006 (0.004)
> 12 hours hmwk*Parents Blue Collar 0.006 (0.004)
< 8 hours hmwk*Parents Professional/Administr. Uni 0.007** (0.003)
> 12 hours hmwk*Parents Professional/Administr. Uni -0.005 (0.004)
Homework Help from: Mother also -0.014*** (0.002)
Father -0.014*** (0.002)
Private Teacher -0.068*** (0.003)
Others -0.020*** (0.003)
Homework help from parents: A little -0.016*** (0.002)
Quite some -0.044*** (0.002)
Much -0.061*** (0.004)
All -0.085*** (0.008)
At home when returning from school: Father also -0.002 (0.001)
Others 0.003** (0.002)
Nobody -0.006** (0.002)
Lives with: Mother only -0.034*** (0.002)
Mother and siblings -0.013*** (0.003)
Mother and father only -0.011*** (0.002)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.007*** (0.002)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.013*** (0.002)
Started School between 3 and 5 -0.004*** (0.001)
age 6 -0.030*** (0.005)
age 7 -0.065*** (0.008)
Born in Romania 0.012*** (0.005)
Morocco -0.050*** (0.009)
in China -0.053*** (0.012)
elsewhere -0.004 (0.003)
Latin America -0.024*** (0.003)
With special needs -0.185*** (0.005)
Disabled -0.250*** (0.007)
Girl -0.004*** (0.001)
Has repeated grade -0.083*** (0.002)
Constant 4.690*** (0.003)
Observations 46,636
Number of Schools 1,222
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain, who started
school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (blue collar workers) and one sibling whose mother
is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
5 Conclusion
In the theoretical model presented in this paper academic attainment which entails an
income premium in the labor market is noisily determined by eﬀort and the student's
ability to beneﬁt from education which depends in turn on her family background and
innate talent. We showed that if schools can set the optimal passing standard the re-
lation between eﬀort and family background is positive (negative) when the degree of
risk aversion is smaller (larger) than the elasticity measuring the sensitivity of marginal
productivity of the student's eﬀort with respect to her family background. Given that
the empirical literature regarding student eﬀort and family background is quite scarce
we analyze the question empirically and ﬁnd that an improvement in parental education
from not having completed compulsory education to holding a university degree is associ-
ated to around 15% more eﬀort by the student (approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes of
additional weekly homework). In addition, we ﬁnd empirical support for our assumption
that students' marginal productivity of eﬀort varies with family background.
Our results come with a caveat. Given the young age of students in our data (12 years),
it is not clear that their decision about how much eﬀort to exert is exactly formed in
the way suggested by our theoretical model, i.e. fully taking into account labor mar-
ket consequences of exerting more or less eﬀort. Hence, while we can conﬁrm a positive
relationship between eﬀort and family background for young school children the origin
of this relation might be somewhat more complex, possibly including parental concerns.
This caveat clearly restricts the possibility to generalize the positive relationship between
eﬀort and family background found to other groups (university students, postgraduate
students). The eﬀort decision of older students might be more similar to our theoretical
model and their notion of risk aversion more closely related to that of adults. Thus, it
could even be the case that for them, the risk aversion eﬀect could dominate the cross pro-
ductivity eﬀect, possibly reversing our result regarding the positive relationship between
family background and student eﬀort. Findings by the empirical literature on higher ed-
ucation achievement of private school students doing worse conditional on measures of
prior achievement may point into this direction. For instance according to Smith and
Nylor [2001a], students who attended private secondary school are 4 percentage points
less likely to complete their degree compared to students who attended a state school.
In a diﬀerent paper the same authors, Smith and Naylor [2001b] ﬁnd a similar result
for degree achievement, namely that attendance of private secondary schools has a neg-
ative eﬀect on degree performance for economics graduates. On the other hand, while
our data set has the shortcoming discussed here, considering students at a younger age
avoids problems of selection that might occur at higher levels of schooling with those who
exert very little eﬀort dropping out of school. If the majority of drop-outs come from
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less privileged backgrounds, the relationship between family background and eﬀort could
possibly change from an initial positive relationship in primary school to a negative one
at university.
Given that doubts about the relationship between family background and student eﬀort
remain, the paper illustrates the importance of future empirical research to illustrate the
degree of income risk eﬀects on educational choices, and particularly on student eﬀort for
diﬀerent age groups. As discussed before, our empirical ﬁnding are far from conclusive
and are also clearly restraint by the endogeneity that arises when regressing achievement
on eﬀort. Finally, one interesting aspect in terms of policy design would be to develop
mechanisms that are able to induce students to exert optimal levels of eﬀort.
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Table A-1: Summary Statistics: CDI Cohort 2009/2010
Variable Mean Value (St.D)
Overall Test Score 101 (14) (Min 51.52 Max 121.40)
Girl 0.49
Age 12.13 (0.36) (Min: 11 Max: 14)
Repeating grades 0.13
Disabled student 0.02
Student with special needs 0.05
Attending:
Public School 51.32
Private School 10.14
Charter Schools 38.14
Born in:
Spain 0.83
Rumania 0.02
Morocco 0.009
Spanish speaking Latin America 0.09
China 0.005
elsewhere 0.04
Started school
before age 3 0.55
age 3-5 0.42
age 6 0.02
age 7 0.01
Highest Education among Parents:
University 0.48
Apprenticeship 0.18
Upper secondary education 0.12
Lower secondary education 0.17
Without compulsory education 0.05
Years of schooling 12.98 (3.44)(Min 5 Max 16)
Highest Occupation among Parents:
Professionals 0.34
Administrative workers 0.23
Blue collar worker 0.44
N 46,636
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Table A-2: Summary Statistics continued
Variable Mean Value (St.d)
Lives with:
Mother 0.07
Mother and one sibling 0.04
Mother and more than one sibling 0.02
Mother and father 0.16
Mother and father and one sibling 0.43
Mother and father and more than one sibling 0.17
Diﬀerent living arrangement 0.12
When returning from school, awaited by:
Mother 0.53
Father 0.10
Mother and father 0.17
Others 0.15
Nobody 0.06
Homework Habits:
Weekly hours of homework 8.93 (5.90)(Min 1 Max 40)
Help from mother 0.29
Help from father 0.10
Help from mother and father 0.22
Help from private teacher 0.05
Help from others 0.06
Help from nobody 0.27
No help form parents 0.16
A little help form parents 0.63
Quite some help form parents 0.15
Much help form parents 0.05
All help from parents 0.008
N 46,636
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Table A-3: Detailed Test Statistics for CDI Cohort 2009/2010
Variable Mean Value (St.D) Min Max
Test Scores:
Dictation 100 (15) 56.53 111.62
Reading 100 (15) 62.31 114.88
Language 100 (15) 50.0 117.4
General Skills 100 (15) 60.17 119.39
Mathematics 100 (15) 70.30 124.94
Table A-4: Equivalence in number of years for educational categories
Variable Mean Years of Schooling
University 16
Apprenticeship 12.5
Higher secondary education 12
Lower secondary education 8
Compulsory education not completed 5
Table A-5: Homework Time - Categories - Percentage of Students in Sample
Parental Occupation: Blue Colllar Administrative /Professional
Parental Education: Any Any excluding University University
Hours All
1-7 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.43
8-12 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.32
> 12 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.25
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